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RECENT DECISIONS

WILLS - CONVEYANCES CONDITIONED ON GRANTOR'S DEATH - CONTRACTS FOR PosTHUMOUs PERFORMANCE By an instrument entitled a
lease, the owner of a country estate agreed with the Y.M.C.A. that the latter
should have a lease of the land for his life in consideration of the payment of taxes
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and the maintenance and improvement of a boys' camp on the premises. Further, if at his death the lease were in good standing ( a right of entry for condition broken having been reserved), then the Y.M.C.A. was to receive full
title to the land. Pursuant to the agreement the camp was operated, and at the
lessor's death the Y.M.C.A. was in possession in good standing. In an action
by the Y.M.C.A. for a decree directing the executor of the lessor's estate to
execute full deeds to it, the heirs of the lessor denied the validity of the "lease"
to give any rights surviving the lessor's death. Held, the Y.M.C.A. had no right
to title in the land; the deceased had attempted a testamentary disposition of his
property which failed under the statute of wills. In re Murphy's Estate, (Wash.

1938) 75 P. (2d) 916.1
The mechanics to which one may resort in providing for the posthumous
disposition of his property are characteristically restricted by a broad public
interest making invalid those devices susceptible of fraudulent misuse. 2 This
broad policy is effectuated by the formalism of wills, trusts and present deeds,
and by the rigid requirements for adequate consideration in contracts for
posthumous performance.3 Only if the policy is carefully observed and the
mechanical requirements closely followed, may one continue the enjoyment of
his property for life and yet be assured that the courts will enforce his provisions
for later distribution.4 The validity of these devices is unquestioned, despite the
definite testamentary savor of many contracts, deeds, and trusts. 5 The difficulty
1 After a former hearing as reported in 71 P. (2d) 6, (1937), the court had
upheld the instrument as a valid and enforceable contract for posthumous performance.
The division of the court there was four to five. One justice retired and his successor,
on the· rehearing herein considered, changed the complexion of the court five to four
against the validity of the instrument.
2 Posthumous dispositions of property were effective by a "testament in writing
or otherwise by an act lawfully executed" under the Statute of Wills, 34 & 35 Hen.
8, c. 5 (1542). The difficulty of combatting the fraud which followed led to the
enactment of the Statute of Frauds, 29•Car. 2, c. 3 (1676), "for prevention of many
fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by; perjury and
subordination of perjury." Similar difficulties of proof require a certain restriction in
other methods of disposition. Cf. Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N. Y. 39 at 47, 69 N. E.
II8 (1903).
8 See 36 CoL. L. REV. 834 (1936); Velikanje v. Dickman, 98 Wash. 584,
168 P. 465 (1917); Potts v. Mathis, 149 Ga. 367, 100 S. E. IIO (1919). Cf.
Justice Holmes' approach in Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28 N. E. 578 (1891).
4 The courts are not at all uniform in the strictness with which they require that
wills conform to the formality set by statute, or that instruments of testamentary force
be drawn as wills. See 16 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 269 (1936) for the suggestion that
courts strict in one respect will be strict in both. This accounts for the decision in
American University v. Conover, II5 N. J. 468, 180 A. 830 (1936).
5 The postponement of the actual transfer of property till death, plus a certain
power of revocation reserved to the transferor, are the qualities generally referred to as
testamentary. The first may be found equally in contracts, deeds and trusts. The second
quality may be realized to a degree in contracts [ see 20 CoL. L. REv. 468 ( 1920)],
to a considerable extent as to deeds [see Ballantine, "When Are Deeds Testamentary?"
I 8 MICH. L. REV. 4 70 ( I 920)], and practically completely as to trusts [ see 28 MICH.
L. REV. 603 (1930)].
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attending the enforcement of these inter vivos devices arises when the actual
transfer of property is conditioned or contingent upon circumstances at the
death of the transferor. If the instrument is a conveyance, the problem is to
determine the nature of the interest created at its execution, a matter of interpreting the intention of the grantor. 6 The interest may be contingent or vested,
present or future; but if positively conveyed, the fact that it ripens to full title
on the grantor's death is a fact of no more significance than the setting of any
other date. 7 If the instrument in the instant case were to be considered a conveyance, it is submitted that whether the grantor created a contingent estate
on a condition precedent ( the good standing of the lease at death), or a fee
f:imple with a power of termination reserved for life, 8 either interest was
placed by the grantor beyond his control without need for further act on his
part to give the Y.M.C.A. full right to the premises. The contrary ruling of
the court that the condition made the conveyance ineffective till death and so
testamentary would seem logically to make deeds invalid whenever the grantor
so much as reserves a life estate.9 But the court, in part at least, considered the
instrument as a contract. So regarded, the same rules of construction would
indicate that the promisee held an equitable interest surviving the death of the
promisor, which interest became absolute upon the performance of the consideration stipulated.10 This would follow whether the property was promised as
a bequest,11 as against the estate,12 or as a direction to the promisor's executors to
convey subsequently.13 Either way, the contract would be enforceable at law 14
18 C. J. 252, § 198 (1919); North v. North, {Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 2 S. W.
{2d) 481.
1
n A. L. R. 23 (1921); Hall v. Hall, 206 Iowa 1,218 N. W. 35 (1928).
8
The problem is that of construing a condition as precedent or subsequent. See
Rannel v. Rowe, 74 C. C. A. {8th) 376, 145 F. 296 (1906). If possible, courts will
construe a remainder as vested, Warne v. Sorge, 258 Mo. 162 at 171, 167 S. W.
967 (1914), but not, of course, against the intent of the parties as drawn from the
instrument. Note that if the estate did not vest till the contingency, it was the terms
and not the nature of the instrument that produced this result. 5 FoRDHAM L. REV.
374 (1936); Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray (78 Mass.) 227 {1858).
9
The court may have been correct in considering the remainder to the Y.M.C.A.
as contingent, vesting only on Murphy's death. But it is not clear whether the court,
in demanding that "the present interest required to be transferred • • • within the
meaning of the rule, is an interest which will survive the death of the grantor''-75
P. (2d) 916 at 919-would require possession to antidate the grantor's death, or
only that the estate vest prior to his death. See Young v. O'Donnell, 129 Wash. 219,
224 P. 682 (1924), as indicating the probable attitude of the court to recognize such
conveyances.
10 20 CoL. L. REV. 468 (1920). For a list of the types of consideration given for
the promise of the property, see 68 C. J. 571, note 56 (1934).
11
Bruce v. Moon, 57 S. C. 60, 35 S. E. 415 (1899). See 68 C. J. 568 (1934).
12
Hale v. Wilmarth, 274 Mass. 186, 174 N. E. 232 (1931); Stewart v. Todd,
190 Iowa 283, 173 N. W. 619, 180 N. W. 146 (1920).
13 In re Fuhrmann's Estate, 209 Wis. 218, 244 N. W. 628 (1932).
14 Damages might be given on an anticipatory breach theory even before the
death of the promiser. See Synge v. Synge, [1894] l Q. B. 466 (1894). As to
6
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or in equity.15 The court held, nevertheless, that the consideration was given
solely for the life interest, making the remainder a mere gratuity which failed
as an attempted testamentation.16 It is submitted that in this construction the
court did grave violence to the expressed intention of the parties. The scheme
of the promisor was entire, not separated into a contract and a gratuity; the
consideration itself contemplated an enduring estate in the Y.M.C.A.; the
mechanics of the plan were surrounded with an abundance of formality and a
certainty in detail that negatived any possibility of the misuse of the arrangements for fraudulent purposes. It is submitted that the court groped unnecessarily to find a vested remainder in the Y.M.C.A. before consenting to effectuate
the instrument as a conveyance, and that, as a contract, the instrument stipulated an adequate consideration for a posthumous transfer.

Charles Haines, Jr.
damage awards given against the estate of the promisor, see Brooks v. Yarbrough,
(C. C. A. 10th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 527 at 531.
15 Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 160 N. Y. S. 624 (1916); Young v. Young,
251 Mass. 218, 146 N. E. 574 (1925). See Hirsch, "Contracts to Devise and Bequeath," 9 Wis. L. REv. 267, 388 at 395 ff. (1934).
16 In 75 P. (2d) at 919, the court said, "The leasehold interest which passed to
the respondent passed by virtue of the leasing contract and not under the provisions
of paragraph 24 of the contract. • •• [That] paragraph provides that the property is
to become, on the death of the lessor, the property of respondent. This is the same
direction that would have been given in an instrument expressly named as, and intended
by the maker to be, a will." Paragraph 24 provided that "said transfer and passing shall
not be regarded as a gift or devise, but for a good and sufficient consideration"
( the services under the lease). Cf. the treatment of the provision by the (ultimate)
minority on the first hearing, 71 P. (2d) at 12.

